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The federal government has developed a large number of programs to insure various “specialty crops”
over the last two decades; a given program is peculiar to a particular county and crop. This development
has been particularly notable in California, because of its size and the diversity of crops produced there.
If the extension of federal crop insurance programs to cover fruit and vegetable production has affected
either producer or consumer welfare, then we would expect to see this reflected in output and prices.
Exploiting variation in the timing of program introduction in different locations for different crops
to estimate the effect of crop insurance on the output and prices of the insured crops.
We ￿nd that the supply of and demand for insurance for tree crops is much larger than for non-tree
crops. Crop insurance has a small but signi￿cant negative effect on prices of insured crops. This last
￿nding is consistent with the view that demand for such highly disaggregated commodities is likely
to be highly elastic. A consequence is that crop insurance for these specialty crops has little benefit
for consumers, even when it generates a large supply response.
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Abstract. The federal government has developed a large number
of programs to insure various \specialty crops" over the last two
decades; a given program is peculiar to a particular county and
crop. This development has been particularly notable in California,
because of its size and the diversity of crops produced there.
If the extension of federal crop insurance programs to cover fruit
and vegetable production has aected either producer or consumer
welfare, then we would expect to see this reected in output and
prices. Exploiting variation in the timing of program introduction
in dierent locations for dierent crops to estimate the eect of
crop insurance on the output and prices of the insured crops.
We nd that the supply of and demand for insurance for tree
crops is much larger than for non-tree crops. Crop insurance has
a small but signicant negative eect on prices of insured crops.
This last nding is consistent with the view that demand for such
highly disaggregated commodities is likely to be highly elastic. A
consequence is that crop insurance for these specialty crops has
little benet for consumers, even when it generates a large supply
response.
1. Introduction
The Federal Government has played a role in providing crop insur-
ance to producers of particular sorts of crops across the United States
since 1938, soon after Franklin Delanor Roosevelt announced the cre-
ation of an institution to provide such insurance. FDR's rationale for
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the program had explicitly to do with smoothing supply, as \...neither
producers nor consumers are beneted by wide uctuations in either
prices or supplies of farm products."
1
The original system Roosevelt proposed was for wheat, and allowed
payment of both premia and indemnities in either cash or in kind, at
least in part because in-kind payments by farmers could be used to
establish buer stocks of wheat. What became the Federal Crop Insur-
ance Corporation (FCIC) no longer accepts or makes in-kind payments,
and the federal government no longer makes any eort to reduce varia-
tion in prices by managing buer-stocks of wheat or other commodities.
It seems that the original motivation for the program|to smooth food
supply and prices|has changed. The motivation now has to do with
providing an orderly way to improve producer welfare by providing
payments to producers in states of nature when either yields or prices
are low.
It's been possible to purchase policies to cover low yields of wheat in
many states since Federal crop insurance began in 1938. However, both
the areas and the crops for which policies are available have expanded
over time. Insurance to cover low yields of \program" crops other than
wheat emerged in many states in the years subsequent to 1938, and
expanded beyond the program crops the the passage of the 1980 \Fed-
eral Crop Insurance Act". Only since the late nineties, however, have
policies become available for insuring against losses associated with the
production of most fruits and vegetables. The number and variety of
such products have expanded dramatically over the last decade, fol-
lowing legislative changes made in 1994, 1996 and 2000 designed to
encourage the use of crop insurance by farmers.
To grasp the scale of the change, consider just the case of California,
where a predominance of fruit and vegetable crops are grown. A given
insurance product is specic to a particular crop and county of produc-
tion. Figure 1 shows both the number of county-crops in a given year
according to NASS, and the number of county-crop insurance prod-
ucts oered. From the gure, one can see that in 1981 there were just
a handful of contracts oered (28; for almonds, citrus, grapes, raisins
and processing tomatoes). There was a sharp increase in 1989, to nearly
500 products, and then an explosion in 1990, followed by an even larger
explosion in 1995. The number of products has grown since, and now
amounts to about 2300 products across California's 58 counties.
There are two types of justications typically oered for the provi-
sion of crop insurance. The rst has to do with concern for producers'
1New York Times, Feb. 19 1937.SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE 3
Figure 1. Number of County-Crop Observations and
Freqency of County-Crop Insurance Contracts, by Year.
welfare. This is not a trivial concern, especially for fruits and veg-
etables, since these commodities may involve much more risk than do
cereal crops. The second has to do with consumer welfare|the idea is
that by providing insurance to a risk-averse producer one can induce
those individual producers to act as though they were more nearly
risk-neutral, and more willing to make production and management
decisions consonant with the interests of consumers. Further, such
programs could be expected to encourage entry by new producers, as
it lowers the costs to production by risk-averse producers, and thus
lower prices.
Specialty crops, particularly fruits and vegetables, dier in several
important respects from traditional commodity crops in ways which
may aect both demand for insurance and the diculty of supplying
insurance. Let us rst consider some demand-side issues. First, prices
for many perishable fruits and vegetables have much greater variation
than do prices for storable commodities. One might expect this to
create increased demand for crop insurance which could deal with this
price risk. However, second, a predominance of fruits and vegetable
crops in California are marketed via vertical contracts with intermedi-
aries, and in many cases these contracts already play an important role
in the producer's risk management (Wolf et al., 2001). The existence
of these alternative arrangements for managing risk ought to tend to4 SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE
reduce demand for federal crop insurance. Third, because production
of many specialty crops is concentrated within a relatively small geo-
graphical area, spatial (e.g., weather) shocks which aect production in
this area will have a much larger eect on aggregate supply than would
a similar shock for a commodity with more geographically dispersed
production. As a consequence, negative shocks to yield will cause pos-
itive shocks to price|it's not even clear that the average producer will
be harmed by such production shocks, since the increase in price may
easily exceed the decrease in aggregate production. Thus, demand for
yield insurance for any commodity with a combination of geographic
concentration of production and inelastic short run demand should be
expected to be very low.
Turning to the supply side, the sheer diversity of specialty crops
both across commodities and across space for a particular commodity
makes the design of appropriate insurance products more demanding
than it may be for commodity crops. Further, the well-developed or-
ganizations which serve, e.g. wheat farmers in other states and which
may serve as an important channel for identifying and marketing to
relevant producers will be absent for many (though not all) specialty
crops. Related, to the extent that designing an insurance product for a
particular crop involves some level of xed costs (e.g., the costs of the
ve-year feasibility and pilot programs the RMA conducts), then the
return to the investment made in these xed costs may be lower in a
state where there are many diverse crops with geographically concen-
trated production.
If the extension of federal crop insurance programs to cover fruit and
vegetable production has aected either producer or consumer welfare,
then we would expect to see this reected in output and prices. We
have high frequency (weekly) data available for wholesale prices of a
wide range of fruits and vegetables in California and elsewhere in the
country. We have monthly production data for many crops by Califor-
nia county. And then nally we have data on the expansion of crop
insurance programs across counties, years, and crops.
This paper uses data on crop insurance policies to explore the varia-
tion in the timing of their introduction in dierent locations for dierent
crops. Aside from simply seeking to describe the data, we're interested
in using these data to try and understand something about the supply
of insurance (the topic of Section 3). In Section 4 we tackle the cen-
tral question of the paper: what eect does the introduction of crop
insurance programs have on output of the insured crops and on prices
of those crops? Section 5 concludes.SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE 5
2. Data on Insurance for Specialty Crops in California
2.1. Data Sources. For the results and discussion of specialty crop
insurance in California found in this paper, we rely principally on two
dierent sources of data. First, data on agricultural production and
prices collected by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS),
which maintains a database of agricultural production and prices since
1980.
2 These data include information for produce as well as for live-
stock and other crops. Second, the Risk Management Agency (RMA)
which administers the FCIC insurance policies maintains a database of
insurance policies sold for qualifying agricultural products.
3
Using data from these two sources, we construct a database which
matches data on insurance supply and demand with data on production
and prices. The unit of observation in the resulting dataset is a county-
crop-year: Since the number of California counties hasn't changed over
the period 1981{2007 (the period our analysis covers) and the crops
NASS has collected data on haven't much changed, we have a balanced
dataset of 190 crops over 26 years and 57 counties (only urban San
Francisco County is missing). However, as not all crops are grown
in every county, the total number of crop-county pairs is 1053, and
the total number of crop-county-year observations is 29,485. Because
NASS and RMA use slightly dierent methods of identifying crops, we
had to construct a concordance to match up data from these respective
sources: details may be found in Appendix A.
2.2. Brief Descriptive History.
2.2.1. Crop Insurance in California. Though a program of federal crop
insurance began in the United States in 1938, until 1981 the operations
of the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) were extremely lim-
ited in two ways. First, prior to 1981 the FCIC only insured program
commodities such as grains, dairy and oilseeds, and second, crop in-
surance consisted mainly of free disaster coverage. However, 1980 saw
the passage of the Agricultural and Food Act, which was meant to re-
place free coverage with an experimental \BUYUP" insurance which
required participants to pay an insurance premium for coverage, and
which was to be made available for a much broader variety of crops
(beyond commodity crops).
Demand in California for the insurance products oered in the eight-
ies was weak. Demand everywhere was weak|despite subsidies which
made the expected return to insurance policies large and positive for
2http://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics by State/California/Publications/AgComm/indexcac.asp
3http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/sob/scc/6 SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE
Figure 2. Number of policies sold in California, by cat-
egory and year.
the average enrolled producer, only 25 percent of eligible acreage was
enrolled by 1988 (Glauber, 2004). But because of inadequate data
with which to rate policies for specialty crops, insurance products sim-
ply didn't exist to cover more than a very small share of agricultural
production in California. Figure 3 shows a time series of the number
of crops for which policies were oered in California, by year: in 1981
there were only 13 such crops (basically the program crops plus policies
for almonds, citrus, grapes, raisins, and tomatoes).
Further, prior to 1985, insurable yields for a particular farm de-
pended on average yields in the county, and adequate data to estimate
the distribution of county-level yields even for the small number of
insurable crops was limited to a handful of California counties.
After the passage of two ad hoc disaster bills (in 1988 and 1993)
(Risk Management Agency, 2009) Congress passed the Federal Crop
Insurance Reform Act of 1994 (FCIRA, 1994). The principal goals of
the Act were to expand coverage to cover more (especially specialty)
crops,
4 and to increase participation by creating a new category of
mandatory.
5 Prior to 1994, the insurance policies available oered var-
ied levels of coverage as a function of the premium amount paid. The
4A list of specialty and nonspecialty crops can be found in Appendix B.
5More precisely, having at least CAT insurance became a criterion for producer
eligibility for a range of other federal programs.SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE 7
Figure 3. Number of insurable crops in California, by year
catastrophic (CAT) coverage oered in 1994 established a low baseline
level of coverage
6 with no premium (though producers were charged a
at nominal administrative fee). The results of this legislative change
for use of crop insurance in California can be seen in Figure 2. In 1995
there was no very large change in demand for the \BUYUP" policies,
but a huge increase in demand for the new quasi-mandatory \CAT"
policies. This huge increase went a considerable way toward achiev-
ing the goal of increasing overall producer participation. However, the
increase in participation evident in Figure 2 for California was almost
entirely due to the new mandatory CAT insurance|no policy for new
California crops was developed by the RMA between 1991 and 1997,
7
at which time programs for apricots and nectarines were developed (see
Table 1).
A second act of Congress, the Federal Agriculture Improvement and
Reform Act of 1996 (FAIR, 1996), gave the option of forgoing CAT in-
surance, in exchange for forfeiture only of eligibility for Federal disaster
6Compensation was for \losses exceeding 50 percent of an average yield paid at
60 percent of the price established for the crop for that year".
7Of the many specialty crops which aren't covered (in at least some counties),
some disaster insurance is available based on county-wide production, rather than
on a given producer's production history. These specialty crops are instead covered
by the \Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program," which was also created by
the 1994 act.8 SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE
Figure 4. Total market values for California agricul-
tural production
Figure 5. Market shares of California agricultural production
benets. The Act also created the Risk Management Agency (RMA)
whose function was to adminster FCIC crop insurance, including re-
searching crops to make insurance available on more crops.SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE 9
2.2.2. Notable Features of California Agriculture. Among the impor-
tant agricultural states, California is notable for the very large share
of specialty crops in the total value of its agricultural production. As
an examination of Figure 4 makes clear, fruits and vegetables collec-
tively accounted for over half the total value of California agricultural
production in 2007, with a collective value of roughly twenty billion
dollars. It's not only that the nominal value of fruits and vegetables
have been increasing sharply since the 1980s; their share in the total
value of California agricultural production has also increased over time,
and have exceeded half of total value since about 2000. The only other
class of agricultural commodities to increase its share over this period
of time is diary, so between Figure 4 and Figure 5 we see a picture
of increasing specialization, with the three highest value categories of
agricultural commodities accounting for an increasing share of total
production over time.
What accounts for this increased specialization? The increase spe-
cialization evident in these gures occurs over the same period in which
insurance for specialty crops is introduced. In a study of program crops,
O'Donoghue et al. (2009) nd that the expansion of crop insurance
associated the 1994 FCIRA led to modest increases in on-farm spe-
cialization, either because producers substituted toward crops whose
expected returns increased with the introduction of subsidized insur-
ance, or because insurance reduced demand for crop-diversication for
risk-management reasons. One possibility is that similar mechanisms
are at work here, and that with the introduction of insurance the im-
provement in the (insured) distribution of returns to growing fruits and
vegetables led farmers to substitute toward these commodities.
This hypothesis is consistent with Figure 6, which shows not only a
steady increase in the total value of Californian agricultural production
over time, but also shows that this increase in value is essentially en-
tirely attributable to the increase in the value of insurable crops (i.e.,
crops produced in a county where insurance is available for that crop).
So one might be tempted to infer that the expansion of crop insurance
to cover specialty crops over this period led an increase in the value of
these crops.
However, this inference is not so straightforward. The problem is
that an increasing number of crops became insurable at an increasing
number of locations over this period. Furthermore, as discussed below
in Section 3, insurance was wasn't randomly assigned to new crop-
counties over time; rather, the total value of the crop in a particular
location was the key variable which led the RMA to create or expand
new programs. So the increase in the value of insurable crops evident10 SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE
Figure 6. Total market value of California agricultural production
in Figure 6 could easily be entirely a consequence of the way the supply
of insurance changed over time, and not have anything to do with
either demand for that insurance or with the eects of insurance on
crop specialization or production. Sorting out these dierent possible
reasons for the increase in the value of insurable crops is the central
goal of this paper.
3. Supply of Insurance for Specialty Crops in California
We have data on a total of 190 dierent agricultural commodities.
These are all produced in California, and result from merging of NASS
and RMA datasets. Of these 190, the RMA classies all but 17 as
\specialty" crops.
There are 173 fruit and vegetable specialty crops grown in California.
Of these, 27 are covered by a crop-specic insurance program in one or
more California counties.
Table 1 shows how new insurance policies are oered for dierent
crops at dierent times. The numbers which appear in each cell indicate
the number of California counties (of which there are 58 in total) for
which insurance policies are oered for a given crop. So, for example,
we see that insurance for walnuts was rst oered in 1985, debuted in




Crop Name `81 `85 `90 `94 `95 `96 `97 `02 `07
1981 Almonds 4 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Citrus Fruit 3 4 8 8 11 12 12 15 15
Grapes 8 15 16 17 24 26 26 31 31
Raisins 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Tomatoes 6 14 11 11 15 15 15 14 12
1982 Dry beans 15 15 15 18 16 18 16 3
1984 Walnuts 10 15 16 25 25 25 24 25
1985 Potatoes 2 1 3 6 5 5 5 13
1986 Peaches 11 13 13 13 11 12 11
Prunes 10 11 12 14 14 14 13
1988 Apples 2 1 9 10 12 17 12
Figs 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
1989 Pears 3 4 8 7 7 7 5
1990 Fresh Mkt
Tomatoes
2 3 6 5 6 5 4
Fresh Plum 6 4 7 8 8 7 6
1997 Apricots 11 11 10
Nectarines 7 7 6




1999 Cherries 2 2
Wild rice 3 3






2007 Alfalfa Seed 1
2008 Pecans 2
Table 1. Number of Counties with Insurance Products
for Dierent Crops. On the left is the rst year the crop
was introduced; generally policies were sold every year
following. Selected years afterward (on the right) are
simply a snapshot of subsequent years, including more
detail around the 1994 FCIRA and 1996 Farm Bill. Each
entry for a year and crop represents only the number of
counties in which policies were sold for that year and
crop.12 SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE
If the decision to oer insurance for a particular crop in a particu-
lar region was left to competitive rms, each seeking to earn a prot
through the development of new policies, then we'd expect the the sup-
ply of insurance to depend on the equilibrium price. However, for crop
insurance in the U.S., the decision to oer insurance for a particular
crop in a particular county is a bureaucratic one, made not by the in-
surance rms that sell the product, but rather by the RMA. It's not
entirely clear what the objectives of the RMA are, but it does seem
clear that maximizing prots from the provision of insurance is not
among its principal objectives: the net cost of crop insurance to the
U.S. treasury is well in excess of 3.5 billion dollars per year (General
Accounting Oce, 2007).8
Regardless of the RMA's objectives in creating new insurance prod-
ucts, we know quite a lot about their decision rule, as they have de-
veloped a rather clear procedure for determining whether to oer in-
surance for a particular specialty crop in a particular region (General
Accounting Oce, 1999, Appendix III).
There are three basic criteria which must all be satised for a prod-
uct to be developed. First, the crop must be \economically signi-
cant"; second, there must be \producer interest"; and third, oering
the product must be \feasible" (General Accounting Oce, 1999, Ap-
pendix III).
The FCIC regards a particular crop economically signicant in a
particular area only if the total market value of the crop is at least one
of the following:
(1) $3 million in the agricultural statistics district (of which there
are nine in California) where it will be covered;
(2) $9 million in the state where it will be covered;
(3) $15 million in the RMA administrative region (of which there
are ten nationwide); or
(4) $30 million nationally.
Producer interest in insurance is considered to be indicated by high
levels of noninsured disaster payments as well as recommendations by
8It's possible that the RMA weighs the costs of this subsidy against what the
costs of disaster relief would be in absence of crop insurance. In 2002, when insured
acreage nationwide was roughly 80 per cent of the total with average coverage
of roughly 60 per cent, Congress allocated $2.1 billion in supplemental disaster
assistance. If in the absence of any crop insurance the Congress allocated enough
money to provide similar relief the allocation would then be on the order of $4.4
billion. But since disasters of this scale seem to occur less often than every other
year, it's not at all clear that ad hoc disaster relief is less cost-eective than are
existing crop insurance programs.SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE 13
RMA regional oces. For a pilot program to be initiated projected
producer participation in the program much be at least 10 per cent.
Oering an insurance product may be infeasible if, for example, there
are inadequate data to evaluate the actuarial soundness of the product;
if mechanisms to market the product are lacking; or if the proposed
product itself is too complicated (General Accounting Oce, 1999).
Once the RMA has decided to try to develop a new insurance prod-
uct, the process of development takes about ve years to complete.
including two years of feasibility studies and three years to carry out a
pilot program.
Operationally, the criteria for economic signicance described above
don't oer sucient guidance about what crops to develop programs
for, as very many crops in many locations satisfy those criterion, and
the RMA presumably lacks the resources to develop programs for all of
these at once.9 To deal with these constraints, the RMA has developed
a list of crops ranked according to market value. We understand from
conversations with analysts within RMA that this list provides primary
guidance about what crop to focus on next, and that the RMA seldom
initiates new programs for more than a single crop per year.
Specication
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
County Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crop Fixed Eects No Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eects No No Yes Yes
Value Rank-Year Interactions No No No Yes
Log-likelihood  14061:02  6627:50  4382:37  4341:32
Degrees of Freedom 57 162 24 27
Table 2. Factors eecting the probability of new crop
insurance programs across dierent counties.
We wish to test the hypothesis that the RMA's decisions regarding
what crops to insure in what counties depend on the value of the crop
in dierent counties. Our approach is to model the probability of a
policy being oered for a particular crop-county-year. Let dijt be equal
to one if a policy for crop j is oered in county i in year t, and equal
to zero otherwise.
9Over the period 1982{2008 there has been on average less than one new Cali-
fornia crop program developed per year, and in no year has there been more than
two new crop programs introduced.14 SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE
We imagine that there are characteristics of counties or crops which
are essentially xed in the short run, but which may aect the prob-
ability of a crop policy being introduced in that county. Obvious fea-
tures of counties which could matter include the overall importance of
agriculture in that county, or the eectiveness of insurance salespeople
operating in that particular area. Features of crops which are xed and
may aect the probability of policy introduction may include features
of the commodity itself which may make it infeasible to introduce in-
surance, or involve commodity-specic grower associations which are
more or less enthusiastic about the introduction of insurance policies for
their particular crop (a correspondent at the RMA tells us that lettuce
growers in California have resisted the introduction of crop insurance).
Let Rjt denote the RMA's ranking of the crop value in year t (with
the lowest-value crop receiving a ranking of 1). We estimate







where the fig are a collection of county xed eects, the fjg are a
collection of crop xed eects, and the ftg are a collection of year
eects. The term (
Pt
s=1 s)Rjt allows there to be a time varying but
cumulative eect of crop ranking on probability of a policy being of-
fered.
We use a logistic model to estimate (1), with results reported in Table
2. Each successive column adds an additional collection of variables
and reports the resulting log-likelihood, so that column (1) for example
presents a measure of t for a regression of policy oerings on just a
set of county xed eects, column two adds crop xed eects, and so
on. The reported log-likelihood ratios allow us to construct likelihood
ratio tests of the null hypothesis that the coecients associated with
the newly added variables are all equal to zero.
Each of the collections of county, crop, and year eects jointly are sig-
nicant, and explain a great deal of variation in whether or not a policy
is oered. Though no individual term in the `rank-year' interactions
is statistically signicant, these are collectively extremely important
in terms of explaining variation. We interpret this as evidence that
even after throwing out variation at the level of the county, the crop,
and the year that our characterization of the RMA's supply decision
is useful in predicting what crop-counties will have insurance products
developed for them.SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE 15
4. Effects of Insurance on Output and Prices
The consequences of crop insurance programs for consumer welfare
can be presumed to depend on two dierent channels: rst, the cost
of the programs to taxpaying consumers; and second, via the eect
the progams have on prices and quantities of agricultural commodities
purchased by consumers.
It's reasonably straightforward to document the direct costs of FCIC
programs for U.S. taxpayers. From the GAO report cited above (Gen-
eral Accounting Oce, 2007), we have a gure of roughly $3.5 billion
per year, or roughly $30 dollars per year for each U.S. household. There
are numerous elaborations on these costs available in the literature, and
on estimates of the welfare losses involved in having the government
involved in eecting these transfers from taxpayers to producers (e.g.,
Gardner and Kramer, 1986; Wright and Hewitt, 1994; Glauber, 2004).
In comparison, the literature on the ultimate eects of crop insurance
on prices and quantities is surprisingly small, and small relative to
the literature on demand for crop insurance or its eects on farmer
behavior. Young et al. (2001) is an exception: using a computable
general equilibrium model they estimate the eects of crop insurance
subsidies on prices and supply of eight program crops. They nd a
small shift (a 0.4% increase in planted acres) toward production of those
crops, but since demand for those same program crops is inelastic prices
tend to fall by a much larger proportion. Overall they compute that the
roughly $1.5 billion dollars spent in crop insurance premium subsidies
led to an increase in farm income of roughly one billion dollars.
Here, by exploiting variation in the timing of the introduction of
crop insurance policies across crops and counties and then combining
this with county-level data on prices and output, we're in a position
to try and deliver some tenative estimates of the eects of crop in-
surance on the observable variables most germane to consume welfare.
The ndings of O'Donoghue et al. (2009) lead us to expect that the
introduction of crop insurance programs will, other things equal, lead
to some substitution toward the insured crop and hence produce an
increase in output. However, the dierent crops we examine are highly
disaggregated and most have close substitutes or can be grown in other
counties, states, or countries. Accordingly, we'd expect demands to be
highly elastic. If this is correct, then increased supply will have at most
a modest eect on prices.
We begin by considering a simple reduced-form supply relationship,
which takes the form
(2) logqijt = i + j + t + dijt + ijt;16 SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE
where (as before) the fig are county-dummies; the fjg are crop dum-
mies; and the ftg are year dummies. A couple of features of this
equation are worthy of note. First, in a supply equation we'd ordi-
narily expect prices to feature prominently on the right-hand-side of
the equation, but prices do not appear explicitly in (2). The reason
is that we implicitly assume that prices will vary only across crops,
counties, and time, and so any variation in price will be captured by
some combination of the dummy variables which appear prominently
in (2).
Second, the crop dummies are particularly important here, as they
allow us to avoid the problem that the output of dierent crops are mea-
sured in dierent units. So long as these incommensurate units (e.g.,
cartons of mature green tomatoes; pounds of almonds) are unchang-
ing over time, the combination of taking logs and adding crop-specic
dummies allows us to compare the dimensionless percentage changes
output across crops.
However, the key coecient of interest for us is , which captures the
eects of introducing crop insurance for a given county-crop on supply.
This coecient can be interpreted as an elasticity|the introduction of
insurance for a particular crop in a particular county be expected to
increase production by a factor .
The problem with estimating (2) as it stands, of course, is that the
introduction of crop insurance is endogenous. Indeed, making the point
that crop insurance depends importantly on observables such as value
rank was the main point of Section 3. However, we can use the results
of Section 3 to address the problem of endogeneity here. In particular,
if one were to take the estimates the conditional probabilities of a
program being introduced for a given crop-county from the estimation
reported in Table 2, we could treat this as a sort of `rst stage' in a two-
stage-least squares estimator of the eects of crop insurance on supply.
For this strategy, we would let ^ dijt denote the estimated probability of
introduction, and then use these estimates in a `second stage'
(3) logqijt = i + j + t +  ^ dijt + ijt:
In eect, the interactions between rank and years which appear in
(1) would act as `instruments' for the endogenous introduction of crop
insurance.
In practice, using a logit-rst stage with a least-squares second stage
would make inecient use of the information contained in the rst
stage right-hand-side variables, and complicate estimation of standard
errors. Accordingly, we adopt a GMM or 3SLS approach to estima-
tion. A nice consequence of this approach is that since we have moreSUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE 17
excluded instruments than coecients to estimate we can also test the
specication and validity of our instruments, as well as remaining quite
agnostic as regards the covariance structure of residuals.10
Our estimate of the value of  in (2) appears in the rst column of
Table 3. We nd that the introduction of insurance for a given crop has
a highly signicant eect on the quantity supplied|there's no doubt
great variation across commodities in terms of this supply response,
but our estimate is that on average there's a 138 percent increase in
output for crops with crop insurance, compared with uninsured crops.
However, our ability to test the underlying specication is useful here:
we're able to reject the hypothesis that our instruments are valid in
this specication at a ve percent level of condence.
In a search for the reasons for the rejection it was suggested to us
that the eects of crop insurance on supply might dier dramatically
between annual and perennial crops, on the logic that sunk costs for
perennial crops implied that producers of such crops would have to
bear considerably greater risk in the absence of insurance. We explore
this idea by introducing an interaction between whether or not a crop
was a \tree crop" or not.11
The second column of Table 3 shows the result. In place of an indi-
cator for \Policy available" we interact a pair of indicator variables for
tree and non-tree crops with the policy availability indicator; the pair
of coecients associated with these variables then become estimates of
the elasticities we seek. And indeed, introducing this heterogeneity of
response makes a remarkable dierence. For tree-crops the estimated
supply elasticity increases somewhat, to 164 percent. But for non-tree
crops the estimate (while still positive) is not statistically distinguish-
able from zero.
The estimated elasticity of 1.64 is not very precisely estimated|a
ninety-ve percent condence interval about this estimate is [1:11;2:17].
But even if imprecise, the elasticity tells us that in counties where crop
insurance for tree crops was introduced it stimulated a doubling or
tripling of production over the 27 years for which we have production
data. But note that this should not be interpreted as evidence of an
10This exibility does come at a price: with a full set of rank-year interactions
the GMM optimal weighting matrix can't be reliably estimated using our nite
sample. Accordingly, we use a smaller set of decade-rank interactions as excluded
instruments in the estimates presented here.
11Not all California crops can be unambiguously identied as annual or perennial,
since for some crops this depends on location. However, all tree crops are perennial,
and so we've used this as a method of distinguishing e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overall increase in output across all crops|(2) doesn't allow us to dis-
tinguish between increases in total output across crops and substitution
between crops. It's entirely possible that the introduction of subsidized
insurance actually leads producers to substitute away from higher-value
crops (or perhaps lower-value crops better suited to a particular farm),
reducing the total value of production.12
We won't pursue the issue of the eects of crop insurance on the
total value of agricultural output here, for want of data (our analysis
here relies heavily on variation across crops, and so aggregating across
these has a high cost in terms of both the statistical power and size of
any tests we might conduct). Instead, we'll return to a consideration
of the demand side, on the grounds that any positive eect of crop
insurance on consumer surplus must come via a reduction in the prices
of insured commodities.
Accordingly, we specify an inverse demand function for produce of
type j from county i in year t according to
(4) logpijt = i + j + t +  logqijt + ijt:
There's some abuse of notation here, as we're `re-using' variables which
entered the supply equation (2). Hopefully context makes it clear that
these are all in fact dierent quantities. Only the quantity supplied
qijt is common across equations (2) and (4). As in our specication of
the supply equation, we have a set of county xed eects, a set of crop
xed eects, and a set of time eects.
As in (2), the crop dummies j are critical allowing us to make
comparisons of price across crops measured using dierent units. The
time eects play an even more important role here than previously,
because they capture changes over time in the value of the dollar|
we've left the values of prices pijt in nominal terms, so that the ftg
terms capture the eects of ination on prices.
In this case, the key variable of interest is quantities|what we'd like
to know is how changes in the quantity supplied aect prices. But of
course these quantities are endogenous|if we didn't already know this
from examination of (2) we could see that we're contending with the
12A casual investigation of this hypothesis involves substituting total crop value
for total crop production in (2). This yields estimates suggesting that the introduc-
tion of insurance results in an increase in tree-crop value smaller than the increase
in tree-crop production, while the value of non-tree crops actually falls signicantly
in response to the introduction of insurance. However, tests of the overidentifying
restrictions result in a rejection of this specication; further investigation is left for
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Variable (1) (2)
Policy Available 1.38* |
(0.23)
Policy Non-tree | 0.50
(0.49)
Policy Tree | 1.64*
(0.27)




Table 3. Estimated Average Supply Response to Crop
Insurance and the Average of the Reciprocal of Price
Elasticity of Demand. For crops grown in California.
The top panel presents GMM estimates of coecients
in (2) (county, crop, and year xed eects are included
but not reported). Figures in parentheses are standard
errors; asterisks indicate signicance at greater than 5
percent level of condence.
classic problem of separately identifying supply and demand relation-
ships. But our estimation of (2) suggests a strategy to address this
endogeneity: by using predicted values of (log) quantities from (2) in
place of actual quantities, we obtain
(5) logpijt = i + j + t +  d logqijt + ijt:
Then estimates of the coecient  can be interpreted as the average
of the reciprocal of price elasticities (thus values close to zero imply
high elasticities). Since this is the only parameter of interest we don't
need a table to report it: we estimate an inverse demand elasticity of
 0:056, with a standard error (computed using the heteroskedasticity-
consistent method of White (1980)) of 0.003. Thus, we nd a negative
elasticity, consistent with the law of demand, and signicantly dierent
from zero. Indeed, our estimate is reasonably precisely estimated|a
95 per cent condence interval about the estimate is [ 0:050; 0:062],
suggesting that demand is quite elastic. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that such highly-disaggregated commodities are likely to
permit a great deal of substitution. As before, recall that this is an
average reciprocal elasticity|for commodities which are only grown in20 SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE
a few counties in California or which possess no close substitutes price
elasticity may be much smaller.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we've gathered evidence on the process by which crop
insurance programs are created, and used this evidence to estimate
the `supply' of crop insurance programs across counties, crops, and
years. We've found that an administrative rule which gives priority to
crops with the highest ranking value has considerable predictive power,
though crop and county specic variables also play an important role.
We've used our predictions regarding the introduction of crop in-
surance to deal with issues of the endogeneity of the supply of crop
insurance programs and estimate the eects of the introduction of crop
insurance programs on both the supply of and demand for dierent
crops.
Our estimates regarding the eects of crop insurance on the supply
of and demand for insured crops indicate that eects dier for tree and
non-tree crops, perhaps as a consequence of the much larger invest-
ments at risk in crops of the former type. We nd what we think is
a rather large eect on supply for tree-crops, but no signicant eect
for non-tree crops. However, we can't say whether the large eect of
insurance on tree-crop production is principally due to more ecient
production or substitution away from other crops.
We nd a signicant negative eect of crop insurance on prices for
insured crops, though the magnitude of the eect is small (around  5{
6 percent). This last nding is consistent with the view that demand
for such highly disaggregated commodities is likely to be highly elastic.
A consequence is that crop insurance for these specialty crops has little
benet for consumers, even if it generates a large supply response.SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE 21
Figure 7. Number of distinct commodities in the Cal-
ifornia agriculture market, as dened by NASS
Appendix A. Detailed Data Description13
The production and insurance data obtained from the NASS and
RMA websites are organized dierently. First, the production data
(which date from 1980) use a unique commodity, county and year as
the unit of observation, while the insurance data groups data by crop,
year, county, and insurance plan. Second, the RMA denitions of crops
are less specic (and broader reaching) than the NASS denitions; thus,
there are many more production commodities than insurance crops.
A.1. Production. Output information is reported as acres harvested,
tons produced, and total market value, as appropriate for the com-
modity type (animal commodities, for example, only include informa-
tion for total market value). The number of counties with production
data stayed primarily constant year over year, ranging from 57 counties
(1980{1988) to 59 counties (2004{2007).
A.1.1. Production Types. The raw data have been further organized
by an external classication by broad production type:
(1) fruit
(2) vegetable
13This appendix was written with Alana LeMarchand. Additional details and
discussion may be found in her Berkeley undergraduate honors thesis of 2009.22 SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE
Figure 8. Distinct agricultural commodity names in









There are many more unique commodities in the fruit and vegetable
categories than in the other categories, although this is not necessar-
ily related to the actual aggregate market value of goods of dierent
types. Analysis of the share of actual market value of each production
category indicated that the number of commodities in each category is
not correlated with market share.
A.2. Insurance. While the insurance data includes such supplemen-
tary information as premium and coverage level, the most pertinent
information is which commodities are insured and the type of insur-
ance plans oered. The total number of commodities insured since 1989
is 63 but there have never been more than 51 commodities insured in
a single year. The number of insured crops began at 23 and increasedSUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE 23
with time, including an abrupt jump in the year 1997 (28 crops in 1996,
37 crops in 1997).
A.2.1. Insurance plan types. There are seven insurance plan types of-
fered. The following description is adapted from material available
on the RMA website14, including information for less traditional pilot
programs15.
AGR: Adjusted Gross Revenue: insures revenue of the entire
farm rather than an individual crop by guaranteeing a percent-
age of average gross farm revenue, including a small amount of
livestock revenue. The plan uses information from a producer's
Schedule F tax forms, and current year expected farm revenue,
to calculate policy revenue guarantee
APH: Actual Production History: insure producers against yield
losses due to natural causes such as drought, excessive moisture,
hail, wind, frost, insects, and disease. The farmer selects the
amount of average yield he or she wishes to insure; from 50-75
percent (in some areas to 85 percent). The farmer also selects
the percent of the predicted price he or she wants to insure;
between 55 and 100 percent of the crop price established an-
nually by RMA. If the harvest is less than the yield insured,
the farmer is paid an indemnity based on the dierence. In-
demnities are calculated by multiplying this dierence by the
insured percentage of the established price selected when crop
insurance was purchased.
ARC: Avocado Revenue Coverage: pilot since 1998
ARH: Actual Revenue History: pilot for dry beans in 2009
CRC: Crop Revenue Covereage: provides revenue protection based
on price and yield expectations by paying for losses below the
guarantee at the higher of an early-season price or the harvest
price
DOL: Dollar Plan: provides protection against declining value
due to damage that causes a yield shortfall. Amount of insur-
ance is based on the cost of growing a crop in a specic area. A
loss occurs when the annual crop value is less than the amount of
insurance. The maximum dollar amount of insurance is stated
on the actuarial document. Amount of insurance is based on
the cost of growing a crop in a specic area. A loss occurs when
the annual crop value is less than the amount of insurance. The
14http://www.rma.usda.gov/policies/
15http://www.rma.usda.gov/pilots/2010pilot.html24 SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE
maximum dollar amount of insurance is stated on the actuarial
document.
GRP: Group Risk Plan: policies use a county index as the basis
for determining a loss. When the county yield for the insured
crop, as determined by National Agricultural Statistics Service
(NASS), falls below the trigger level chosen by the farmer, an
indemnity is paid. Payments are not based on the individual
farmer's loss records. Yield levels are available for up to 90 per-
cent of the expected county yield. GRP protection involves less
paperwork and costs less than the farm-level coverage described
above.
PRV: Pecan Revenue: since 2005, began as a pilot.
A.2.2. Qualitative distribution of plans in the data.
AGR: Adjusted Gross Revenue: This plan is not crop specic
and applies only to the entire production of a farm.
ARH: Actual Revenue History: This plan is sold only beginning
in 2009 as a pilot for dry beans.
GRP: Group Risk Plan: This plan is indexed on county produc-
tion and comprises an insignicant percentage of policies sold.
APH: Actual Production History: This plan is by far the most
common plan type and is linked most directly with production
volume.
CRC: Crop Revenue Covereage: This plan protects a farmer's
crop based on yield and price. It is also more signicant in
terms of numbers than the AGR, ARH, or GRP plans.
DOL: Dollar Plan: This plan protect against yield shortfall below
a certain dollar amount. It is the second most common plan,
after the APH.
PRV: Pecan Revenue: This plan applies only to pecans and could
only be useful in regressions where policies are linked specically
to crops.
ARC: Avocado Revenue Coverage: This plan applies only to av-
ocados and could only be useful in regressions where policies
are linked specically to crops.
A.2.3. Graphical Presentation of Insurance Plan Distribution. Figure
9 presents data on premia, liabilities, indemnities, and subsidies for
each RMA insurance plan category. Raw data is included below each
bar chart in . \Premium" and \Net Reported Acres" are scaled so as
to be more readable.SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE 25
Figure 9. Distribution in California, by RMA insur-
ance plan category , of cumulative monetary value of
total premiums, liabilities, subsidies, and indemnities
Figure 10. Cumulative number of policies of each cat-
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Figure 10 simply indicates the number of policies oered by plan. It
is clear from this data that traditional APH policies comprise the great
majority of RMA insurance plan activity, with the DOL plan a very
distant second. After that, the most signicant share of policies comes
from the AGR, ARC, and CRC plans. As mentioned, AGR insurance
is not crop specic and thus is inappropriate for a crop specic analysis;
ARC insurance is only for avocados; CRC is crop specic and applicable
to many dierent crops. ARH, GRP, and PRV are insignicantly small.
However, ARC, ARH, and PRV plans may be included in regressions
where policies are linked specically to crops. They might also be
studied later on for their inuence on the avocado, dry bean, and pecan
markets, respectively.
A.3. Production-Insurance Correspondence. As shown above, there
are many more production commodities than there are insurance crops.
This due in part to the nature of the insurance crop designation (more
general, spanning several production commodities), but also in part to
the fact that many crops are not insured. Correspondences between
production and information have been established using the crop and
commodity names of each respective data set. There are 100 produc-
tion commodities found to correspond to 56 insurance crops.
All insurance crop designations encompass one or more production
commodity designation except in a few fruit crops. Tangelos, plums,
and apricots have two insurance crop identities corresponding to a sin-
gle production comodity (usually due to a distinction between fresh
and processing grade fruit).
The other notable aspect of the link created between production and
insurance information is that there are 7 commodities which could not
as of yet be linked with production commodities. This is due to am-
biguous categories denitions (i.e. four types of insurance categories
and 6 types of production categories for oranges). These unlinked in-
surance commodities include: special citrus, processing beans, nursery
(container), Adjusted Gross Revenue, stonefruit and oranges.
This correspondence permits the comparison of production of insured
crops to production of uninsured crops. Figure 11 shows that mean
production value of insured crops is above that of uninsured crops over
the entire 30 year period analyzed; overall growth of market value of
insured crops is also greater than for uninsured crops (although this
may not necessarily be true for percent growth).
Appendix B. List of Specialty and Nonspecialty cropsSUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE 27
Figure 11. Mean production value (total market value
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Appendix C. Integration of RMA Crop Value List 16
One such list assembled by the RMA using crop value data from 2005
and 2006 was made available by the RMA correspondent for the above
stated research purposes. The list included information on crops at
all stages in the insurance policy process, from those at full regulatory
status (those already insured) to those not yet being considered for
new policies, and eveything in between. However, since the informal
list contained data for uninsured crops as well as for insured crops,
many crops could not be identied with the unique FCIC crop codes
which have been previously used to organize crop information in the
research database and to dene a correspondence between RMA policy
information and NASS production and price information. Indeed, no
numeric identiers were used at all in the list provided. In addition,
there were several critical discrepancies and complications which must
be resolved before integrating the list information into the database:
 The national crop values reported do not correspond to NASS
nationwide reported crop values (only a few were checked, and
some were o by 50%, but not by orders of magnitude). Since
this the list is signicant for this research as an indicator of
relative crop value as condsidered by the RMA, this may not
be considered signicant.
 One third of the listed crops are missing crop value information
for 2006. According to the RMA correspondant, the incomple-
tion of some columns can be considered insignicant. In this
case it may be preferable to use only the 2005 crop value data
in order to generate a relative ranking of crops by value.
 Three of the crops contained not crop value data whatsoever
(for either year). These crops were chicory, collard greens, and
kale. The latter two crops are grown in California so it remains
16This section drawn from the thesis of Alana LeMarchand.SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE 29
to be determined whether these crops should be thrown out
of the list or not. For now they will be dropped from the list
as insignicant in determining rank by crop value since they
comprise less than 2% of the 163 observations.
 A few high value crops were aggregated in the list. Notably,
citrus fruit (all oranges, grapefruit, etc), citrus trees (a pilot in
Florida), dry beans (limas, red, navy, etc), and oriculture (all
non bulb owers). To appropriately integrate this data into a
new table in the existing database, all crops corresponding to
each of these categories would need to have the same ranking
(or to be aggregated as a single crop to reect the RMA's con-
sideration of them as a single crop. This is generally typical
of RMA reporting compared to NASS reporting: an RMA pol-
icy of a certain general crop name will generally correspond to
apply to several NASS commodities. It is important to note,
however, that there were crops which were subject to aggrega-
tion even among varying RMA crop policies, namely citrus fruit
and peaches.
 Several crops in the nationwide list are not grown in California
and thus are not present in the current database. Since these
crops will not be signicant in the research beyond determining
a nationwide crop value rank, they will not be tied or added to
the current FCIC and NASS crop lists in the database. Their
crop code will be marked null in the database, indicating that
they are not California crops.
An initial version of the list has been generated using the above mod-
ications. For simplicity's sake, we create a third unique identier in
addition to the NASS and FCIC codes in order to capture the aggre-
gation described above.
Correspondences were simple to make in most cases but the following
is a list of crops with problematic correspondences, primarily due to
lack of specicity of which NASS crops are represented by these RMA
crop names, since the RMA uses dierent crop nomenclature than the
NASS does:30 SUPPLY AND EFFECTS OF SPECIALTY CROP INSURANCE
RMA crop name NASS names NASS codes
Corn Corn Grain 111991
Forage Pasture Forage Misc 194799
Forage Seeding Hay Alfalfa, Hay Green
Chop
181999, 195299
Hybrid Seed Corn Corn Seed 171119
Silage: Corn/Sorghum Corn Silage, Sorghum
Silage, Silage
111992, 114992, 195199
Sweet Corn (processing, in-
stead of fresh)
Not distinct from \fresh" in
NASS data
NULL
Trees No evident correspondence NULL
The resulting data have been inserted as three tables with the fol-
lowing elds into the database.
Table Name
rank ID rank list rank status
ID ID codep
ins code status name
prod code value
name
The ID eld in the rst two columns
represents the aggregation solution discussed above. The rank list ta-
ble may be used to generate crop value rankings (as a temporary auto
incremented and indexed table with a MySQL query) based on RMA
status, in the event that it would be useful to include or to exclude
certain status categories (such as \regulatory," which signies crops
already fully insured).
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